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ISSUES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS AND RELIABILITY OF
EVIDENCE FROM NTSB INVESTIGATIONS IN THIRD
PARTY LIABILITY PROCEEDINGS
JACK LONDON*
E VIDENCE OF THE causes of aviation crashes and of the
events leading to aviation crashes is the bedrock of third
party liability litigation arising out of such crashes. The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates the vast major-
ity of the accidents and incidents which are the subject of litiga-
tion. It identifies and observes both objective data such as
speeds, angles, weather, and equipment conditions, and subjec-
tive or opinion evidence such as design errors, maintenance er-
rors, communication errors, and myriad human behaviors
which cause aircraft catastrophes. Such public, professional,
and theoretically neutral evidence would appear to be vital to
litigants, judges, and juries in resolving third party litigation.
However, due both to statutes and to insulating regulations pub-
lished by the NTSB to limit its involvement in third party litiga-
tion, very little of the NTSB's work is ever admitted into
evidence in such cases. Moreover, the evidence that is poten-
tially admissible is also potentially inadmissible due to the man-
ner in which such evidence is gathered and made available.
The system by which the NTSB is organized, performs its in-
vestigative functions, and renders its reports is stretched to the
breaking point. Aviation technology has become so sophisti-
cated that rarely will an NTSB investigator encounter a crash
involving both the same airframe and the same airborne elec-
tronic equipment twice in a career. Unlike the era of broken
cables and missing engine parts, reconstruction of complex
* Mr. London is in private practice in Austin, Texas, where he specializes in
aviation crash litigation and serves as a consulting attorney for Consulado General
de Mexico. He thanks Dean John Sutton of the University of Texas School of Law,
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crashes in which one-of-a kind software applications with previ-
ously unknown failure modes play a role and disappear in the
wreckage is now a very different inquiry than most NTSB investi-
gators have been trained to perform. Moreover, the NTSB's
heavy dependence on party participants to provide technical as-
sistance often results in NTSB reports, observations, and data
which make NTSB evidence fall outside rather than inside the
tests for trustworthiness and reliability which the federal and
most state rules of evidence impose as conditions of
admissibility.
This article will discuss those problems.
I. RULES AND STATUTES
Courts are often called upon to determine whether to admit
evidence of a NTSB investigation-an issue that has several prob-
lematic cornerstones. The circumstances under which NTSB ev-
idence is produced and the limitations on inquiring into its
foundations create complex issues regarding the reliability and
trustworthiness of such evidence.
The admissibility of NTSB reports as public documents is gen-
erally evaluated under Federal (and most States') Rule of Evi-
dence 803(8), the public report exception to the hearsay rule.
That such reports may contain opinions and conclusions, as well
as mere "factual findings," is sanctioned by Beech Aircraft v.
Rainey.' Such reports are presumptively admissible, including
opinions, unless demonstrated to be untrustworthy.
However, a contrary cornerstone of the evidentiary issue is 49
U.S.C. § 1154(b) which provides: "(b) Reports: No part of a re-
port of the Board, related to an accident or an investigation of
an accident, may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil
action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the
report."2
Thus, the rule giveth, and the statute taketh away.
Given that the statute does not define the reports or parts of
reports it bars from admission into evidence, courts and litigants
have staked out battlegrounds in efforts to bring as much of the
NTSB's probable cause determinations to the jury, or to keep
such determinations away from the jury, as possible. These bat-
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1988).
2 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1994). This statute was transferred from former 49
U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1975); cases dated before approximately 1995 which address
the inadmissibility of NTSB reports cite the former statute.
NTSB INVESTIGATIONS
tlegrounds are laid out both in the decisions and in the promul-
gation of federal regulations which attempt to define
documents that should be excluded from admission into evi-
dence under 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b).
Another source of evidence of NTSB investigations is oral tes-
timony. Depending on whether the proposed witness is an em-
ployee of the NTSB or a privately retained expert, such
testimony is generally evaluated within the framework of Federal
(and most States') Rules of Evidence 701, lay opinions, and 702-
703, expert opinions. The nature of NTSB investigations, as will
be seen, creates a very grey area in which expert testimony and
lay testimony overlap so that only the most acutely sensitive
scholars will be able to sort out whether proposed testimony
should be properly characterized as one or the other. The dis-
tinction may prove critical in both procuring such evidence and
in obtaining a ruling on its admissibility.
The decision in Beech Aircraft v. Rainey was written several
years before the Supreme Court issued the practice-altering de-
cision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' Daubert and
subsequent cases have struggled to lay out workable rules to es-
tablish who has the burden of proving that expert opinions are
reliable. The result is that sophisticated expert testimony on
causation is presumptively inadmissible until its sponsor first es-
tablishes that it is reliable. Thus, the admission of opinion testi-
mony under Chapter VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
dealt with in a manner exactly the opposite of admission of writ-
ten evidence which may contain the same opinions and offered
for admission under Rule 803(8). The conflict between expert
reports which would ordinarily be considered admissible under
Rule 803(8) and Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, and the obstacles to ad-
mission which must be cleared under the rules laid out by
Daubert and its progeny, is yet to be resolved. However, regard-
less of whether the proposed evidence is written or oral, some-
one will bear a burden on the issue of trustworthiness and
reliability of such evidence.
Finally, the NTSB itself has walked into a fray in which it is
only tangentially a party. It has issued regulations in an attempt
to control the use of oral testimony about NTSB investigations
in civil litigation. As will be seen, these regulations are frustrat-
ing, occasionally one-sided, and are viewed in differing ways by
various courts and litigants. Even so, interpretation of these reg-
3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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ulations by the court, and by NTSB staff counsel in the course of
litigation, will often play a decisive role in developing evidence
of what happened, what caused the incident or accident, and
who is to blame.
Many of the problems in obtaining such evidence and ruling
on whether it is admissible can be handled within the traditional
framework of the law of evidence. However, due to an anomaly
unique to the investigation of aviation accidents by the NTSB,
the reliability and trustworthiness of such evidence may under-
mine its admissibility. A system known as "the party participant
system" renders questionable for third party litigation much of
the work which goes into many NTSB investigations, at least in-
sofar as concluding that it is reliable or trustworthy for admis-
sion under either Chapter VII or Chapter VIII of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
This article will attempt to shed light on those subjects in an
effort to help courts and litigants resolve subtle but serious is-
sues about the procurement and admission of such evidence.
II. THE MISSION OF THE NTSB IS NOT TO
SERVE LITIGANTS
The mission of the NTSB is to investigate certain aviation,
highway, pipeline, marine, and rail accidents. The Board's pri-
mary contribution is described in 49 U.S.C. § 1116, by which it is
charged to:
(a) .. . report periodically to Congress, departments, agencies,
and instrumentalities of the United States Government and
State and local governmental authorities concerned with
transportation safety, and other interested persons. The re-
port shall-
1) advocate meaningful responses to reduce the likelihood
of transportation accidents similar to those investigated
by the Board; and
2) propose corrective action to make the transportation of
individuals as safe and free from risk of injury as possible,
including action to minimize personal injuries that occur
in transportation accidents.
(b) Studies, investigations, and other reports. The Board also
shall-
1) carry out special studies and investigations about trans-
portation safety, including avoiding personal injury;
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2) examine techniques and methods of accident investiga-
tion and periodically publish recommended procedures
for accident investigations.4
In order to live up to such responsibility, the NTSB performs
on-scene, laboratory, and document investigations of thousands
of accidents and incidents each year. Its tasks are outlined and
its goals defined in a statute that practically mirrors third party
liability litigation. 49 U.S.C. § 1131 specifies:
1) The National Transportation Safety Board shall investi-
gate . . . and establish the facts, circumstances, and cause or
probable cause of-
A. an aircraft accident the Board has authority to
investigate ... ;
B. a highway accident... the Board selects in coopera-
tion with a State;
C. a railroad accident in which there is a fatality or sub-
stantial property damage, or that involves a passen-
ger train;
D. a pipeline accident in which there is a fatality, sub-
stantial property damage, or significant injury to the
environment;
E. a major marine casualty (except a casualty involving
only public vessels) occurring on the navigable wa-
ters or territorial sea of the United States, or involv-
ing a vessel of the United States. . .; and
F. any other accident related to the transportation of in-
dividuals or property when the Board decides-
i. the accident is catastrophic;
ii. the accident involves problems of a recurring
character; or
iii. the investigation of the accident would carry out
this chapter.
The Board shall use the report in establishing cause or probable
cause of an accident described under subsection (a) or (b) of
this section.
(e) Accident reports. The Board shall report on the facts and
circumstances of each accident investigated by it under sub-
section (a) or (b) of this section. The Board shall make
each report available to the public at reasonable cost.5
4 49 U.S.C. § 1116 (1996).
5 49 U.S.C. § 1131 (a)(1)-(2), (e) (1996) (emphasis added).
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III. THE NATURE OF NTSB INVESTIGATIONS
The NTSB is responsible for the investigation of civil aviation
accidents, fatal pipeline accidents, marine accidents involving
public and non-public vessels, and significant highway and pas-
senger train accidents. In addition, the NTSB is the compliance
agency for the United States under Annex 13 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, by which it is responsible for
U.S. contributions to the investigation of accidents in interna-
tional air navigation and transport. In both international and
domestic accident investigations, the NTSB functions in a proac-
tive manner, that is, with the goal of prevention of future acci-
dents and incidents by the determination of the causes of the
events being investigated. It is specifically not the goal of the
NTSB to determine legal responsibility for the cause of an acci-
dent or an incident.6
Investigations generally fall within one of five categories. A
major investigation, typically involving a commercial airliner or
cargo aircraft, is usually investigated through the Washington
headquarters. A major investigation in which substantial issues
relating to safety have been identified, including non-fatal air-
line accidents and commuter accidents, is managed by a re-
gional NTSB office. A field investigation describes the
investigation of general aviation accidents and of non-fatal air-
line incidents and accidents. A field investigation with serious
safety issues or complex investigative problems may occasionally
be as complicated as major investigations. Limited investiga-
tions may take place without a field investigation or major inves-
tigation in events involving general aviation. Finally, the NTSB
may delegate an investigation to the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) in aircraft other than fixed-wing aircraft certifi-
cated above 12,000 pounds, except for fatalities, air taxies, or
mid-air collisions. In those investigations, the FAA completes a
report while the NTSB will make a probable cause determina-
tion. Note that two of the five categories of investigation may'
not involve NTSB employee participation at a scene or by staff
technical analysis.
The NTSB systematically investigates crashes by gathering the
data, the records, and the observations which are particular to
6 An accident is an event which takes place when any person is onboard an
aircraft and sustains a serious injury or death or the aircraft sustains substantial
damage; an incident is an occurrence other than an accident which affects or
could affect safety. 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (2002).
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sub-categories of information about the aircraft, the crew, and
the flight. NTSB investigations vary widely depending upon the
complexity of an event and the safety implications which the
NTSB identifies. An investigation will typically involve the crea-
tion of working groups for each area of investigation which the
Investigator in Charge concludes will lead to particular informa-
tion about the cause of the crash. The assigned Investigator in
Charge will determine which groups, if any, to form for a given
investigation. The formal groups in any one investigation are
typically one or more of the following: Structures, Systems,
Powerplants, Operations, Air Traffic Control, Weather, Human
Factors, Witnesses, Maintenance Records, Flight Data Recorder,
and Cockpit Voice Recorder. Not every investigation results in a
report from every group.
The NTSB has a staff of approximately 400 employees in any
given fiscal year, of whom approximately 150 are assigned as avi-
ation safety employees, 75 are surface transportation employees,
and fewer than 50 are research and engineering employees.
The balance are administrative and policy employees. These
employees, collectively, are responsible for the investigation of
an average of 7 headquarter investigations per year, 10 foreign
investigations per year, and approximately 2,000 general avia-
tion accidents per year, including air charters, recreational
flights, emergency medical flights, and many other forms of
non-carrier activity.7
A subsequent section will address problems within the NTSB
which have been identified by the RAND Institute, an outside
public study group which was engaged to provide a critique to
the NTSB for planning future operations. As a point of refer-
ence, RAND found that while the NTSB is properly considered
the preeminent crash investigation agency in the world, NTSB
employees are also overworked and understaffed, given the
number of cases they must handle, the complexity of the work,
and the conditions they must work under. NTSB aviation inves-
tigative employees average almost 50 work hours per week. This
is far more than the average hours worked by employees of the
companies whose aircraft, pilots and mechanics they are called
upon to investigate.8
7 RAND, Institute for Civil Justice, Safety in the Skies, Personnel and Parties in
NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations: Master Volume, Prepared for the National
Transportation Safety Board (2000) [hereinafter RAND, NTSB Aviation Accident
Investigations].
8 Id. at 146-51.
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IV. THE PARTY PARTICIPANT SYSTEM
The NTSB is presently able to complete its work only because
of a hybrid arrangement generally known as the party participant
system. The system has been created by the Board, under regula-
tion, to augment its limited resources by calling up some, but
not all, of the parties interested in a crash to actually assist the
NTSB in various aspects of the investigation.
The NTSB has been granted regulatory authority in its consti-
tutional statute. 49 U.S.C. § 1113(f) authorizes the NTSB to
"prescribe regulations to carry out this chapter." Pursuant to
such authority it has issued a number of regulations which have
a significant impact on third party litigation, perhaps none
more so than 48 C.F.R. § 831.11, which provides:
Sec. 831.11 Parties to the investigation.
(a) All Investigations, regardless of mode.
(1) The investigator-in-charge designates parties to partici-
pate in the investigation. Parties shall be limited to those per-
sons, government agencies, companies, and associations whose
employees, functions, activities, or products were involved in the
accident or incident and who can provide suitable qualified
technical personnel actively to assist in the investigation.
Other than the FAA in aviation cases, no other entity is
afforded the right to participate in Board investigations.
(2) Participants in the investigation (i.e., party representa-
tives, party coordinators, and/or the larger party organi-
zation) shall be responsive to the direction of Board
representatives and may lose party status if they do not
comply with their assigned duties and activity proscrip-
tions or instructions, or if they conduct themselves in a
manner prejudicial to the investigation.
(3) No party to the investigation shall be represented in any aspect
of the NTSB investigation by any person who also represents
claimants or insurers. No party representative may occupy a le-
gal position (see § 845.13 of this chapter). Failure to comply
with these provisions may result in sanctions, including
loss of status as a party.
(4) Title 49, United States Code § 1132 provides for the ap-
propriate participation of the FAA in Board investiga-
tions, and § 1131 (a) (2) provides for such participation
by other departments, agencies, or instrumentalities.
The FAA and those other entities that meet the require-
ments of paragraph (a) (1) of this section will be parties
to the investigation with the same rights and privileges
and subject to the same limitations as other parties, pro-
vided however that representatives of the FAA need not
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sign the "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB
Investigation" (see paragraph (b) of this section).
(b) Aviation investigations. In addition to compliance with the
complete understanding of the requirements and limitations
of party status, all party representatives in aviation investiga-
tions shall sign "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB
Investigation" immediately upon attaining party representa-
tive status. Failure timely to sign that statement may result in
sanctions, including loss of status as a party.9
At the request of the Investigator in Charge of a given acci-
dent or incident, "those persons, government agencies, compa-
nies, and associations whose employees, functions, activities, or
products were involved in the accident or incident and who can
provide suitable qualified technical personnel actively to assist in
the investigation"' will be invited to participate in the investiga-
tion from the time of crash notification until the completion of
the final report. As a practical matter, this means that manufac-
turers of aircraft and aircraft components, airlines, charter air-
craft operators, component part manufacturers, and
government agencies who have a direct involvement in a crash
are notified as soon as possible that one of their pieces of equip-
ment or one of their employees, or both, were involved in a
crash. These parties usually maintain a 'safety' department
which will send a technical representative to the site to partici-
pate in the on-site identification and recovery of the aircraft
wreckage. These party participants contribute technical knowl-
edge of aircraft systems, such as fuselage diagrams, control
linkage diagrams, powerplant and propeller/rotor details, elec-
tronic equipment on board, and an infinite variety of details
about the aircraft, equipment, crew, and conditions of the
flight. It would be almost impossible for the NTSB or any other
single entity to maintain a comprehensive collection of specific
aircraft details which could be quickly retrieved and taken to the
site to identify components and the condition of components
from burned and twisted wreckage scattered over an infinite va-
riety of crash sites and areas. The manufacturers possess the
technical details of airframes and systems to make this possible.
It is common for the NTSB to transport components and
parts from the crash site to the manufacturers' facilities for
technical analysis. The manufacturers maintain failure laborato-
9 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(a)-(b) (2002) (emphasis added).
10 Id.
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ries and employ materials failure analysis technicians who have
immediate access to manufacturing drawings for their parts and
assemblies. Work performed by manufacturers, powerplant and
component part suppliers, airlines, and others often result in
the creation of reports and support documents, such as photo-
graphs, laboratory samples, and technical drawings. Such docu-
ments are contributed to the NTSB for use by appropriate
groups in the NTSB investigation. In addition, as a party partici-
pant, the party representatives may, if they wish, participate in
any other group involved in the same accident investigation.
For example, a powerplant representative may participate in the
Cockpit Voice Recording group if he elects to do so.
The party participant system provides a relationship of une-
ven quality to the investigations. The NTSB prides itself on in-
dependence and professionalism. However, the threat to
independence was conveyed by one manufacturer's representa-
tive:
Although the NTSB investigators are qualified, experienced, and
professional in accident investigation techniques and manage-
ment, a single investigator may not investigate the same model
helicopter configuration more than once in his/her career. This
is due to the relative rare frequency of accidents and the ex-
tremely large number of model configurations in the fleet. For
example, Bell has produced and fielded 50 different configura-
tions within our 10 commercial model series. We have produced
about 10,500 civil helicopters since the original Model 47 was cer-
tificated in 1946. Within the Model 47 series alone, Bell pro-
duced 24 configurations. Other people have modified the 47 to
new and unknown (to Bell) configurations. With all of this vari-
ety, it is difficult to nearly impossible for an NTSB investigator to
know the basic configurations. Thus the need for the technical
expertise of the manufacturer."
In plain language, the party participants are frequently the
only source of information available to NTSB investigators to
perform their task; a fact which threatens their independence
and occasionally impedes rather than assists investigations. As a
result, the quality of any NTSB evidence is directly affected by
how high, or low, the degree of open, candid, and selfless coop-
eration the party participants contribute.
11 Roy G. Fox, Chief, Product Safety, Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Report on
Proceedings, Aviation Accident Investigation Symposium, VOL. II: PARTICIPANT
PRESENTATIONS, NTSB 217 (1994).
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A contrary feature of the party participant system that has seri-
ous implications for the admissibility of evidence of NTSB inves-
tigations is that it is inherently one-sided. The same regulation
by which the NTSB has created the party system goes on to ex-
clude the parties who are most often and most immediately af-
fected by the investigation, i.e., the victims of a crash.
Paragraph 3 of the regulation provides: "(3) No party to the in-
vestigation shall be represented in any aspect of the NTSB inves-
tigation by any person who also represents claimants or
"I 2insurers....
Accordingly, some indeterminable portion of the investiga-
tion is performed under circumstances which effectively pre-
clude a substantial block of potentially interested parties from
having any role in the affair until the NTSB (and party partici-
pants) completes its hands-on work. At that point, the NTSB
will notify the parties that it is releasing the wreckage or releas-
ing the property of any party participants. The extent to which
excluded parties may inspect, test, examine, analyze, or other-
wise investigate the crash is then no longer a matter under the
control of the NTSB but instead a matter of formal legal discov-
ery and investigation.
Efforts by non-parties to participate, even as observers, in
NTSB investigations have been consistently rebuffed by the
courts. In Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 3 the family of a
pilot sought to be allowed to either serve as a party participant
or as an observer. The Court determined that the NTSB had
the right under Section 831 to choose whether to include or
exclude anyone as a party participant. While the possible investi-
gative contribution of an estate was not apparent, "[t]he use of
Teledyne's facilities and expertise in disassembling its own en-
gines could be indispensable in enabling the NTSB to carry out
its mission" to promote transportation safety by investigations
and formulating safety improvement recommendations, not de-
termine civil liability." The decision went on to foreshadow the
problem which does concern courts which are convened to de-
termine civil liability. The court said: "At most, appellant may
be deprived of certain evidence that could assist her in
litigation."'15
12 49 C.F.R. § 831.11(3) (2002).
13 Graham v. Teledyne-Cont'l Motors, 805 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1987).
14 Id. at 1389.
15 Id. at 1390.
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Thus the problem is framed. When the issue is squarely fo-
cused on the use of NTSB evidence in litigation to determine
civil liability, litigants and trial judges must come to grips with
the problem that such evidence is often less than pristine. The
quality of the information suffers from the process which cre-
ated it and is subject to very real threats of spoliation, untrust-
worthiness, and the subtle evidentiary distinctions between
expert opinion testimony and lay opinion testimony.
V. EVIDENTIARY TAINTS TO NTSB INVESTIGATIONS
A. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
AND RELIABILITY
Beech Aircraft v. Rainey is frequently cited for the proposition
that a public record of an investigative report is not inadmissible
merely because it contains opinions as opposed to factual find-
ings. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,
wrote that "factual findings admissible under Rule 803(8) (C)
may be those which are made by the preparer of the report from
disputed evidence .... We agree and hold that factually based
conclusions or opinions are not on that account excluded from
the scope of Rule 803(8) (C)."' 6 However, the Court very clearly
warned all concerned that while Rule 803(8) (C) assumes that a
government report or document is admissible in the first in-
stance, the rule provides "ample provision for escape if suffi-
cient negative factors are present."' 7
The Court endorsed the comments to Rule 803(8) (C) which
list four non-exclusive factors to consider in determining
whether an offered report is trustworthy: (1) timeliness of the
investigation; (2) the investigator's skill; (3) whether a hearing
was held; and (4) possible bias. The Court went to great lengths
to write that the determining test was whether the offered report
was trustworthy, not whether the opinions or conclusions it con-
tained were found to be lay opinions or expert opinions. The
Court stated:
Our conclusion that neither language of the Rule nor the intent
of its framers calls for a distinction between "fact" and "opinion"
is strengthened by the analytical difficulty of drawing such a line.
16 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 162 (1998). The Court, citing
Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933
(1979), adopted a broader interpretation of the rule rather than a restrictive view
that factual findings did not encompass opinions or conclusions.
17 Id. at 167.
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It has frequently been remarked that the distinction between
statements of fact and opinion is, at best, one of degree:
"All statements in language are statements of opinion, i.e., state-
ments of mental processes or perceptions. So-called 'statements
of fact' are only more specific statements of opinion. What the
judge means to say, when he asks the witness to state the facts, is:
'The nature of this case requires that you be more specific, if you
can, in your description of what you saw."""
The Court then observed that the disputed report in question
contained the factual finding that the engine was operating, but
at reduced power; a finding the investigator presumably reached
on the basis of clues in the wreckage. Next, the Court stated
that its decision to admit opinion findings into evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule was consistent with "relaxing the
traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony."' 9 The Court noted
that Rules of Evidence 702-705 allow admission into evidence of
ultimate expert opinions and that Rule 701 even permits lay wit-
nesses to express opinions drawn from observations.
It is in the application of Beech Aircraft v. Rainey to NTSB evi-
dence that such reasonable principles become bogged down.
First, Beech Aircraft did not deal with an NTSB report. Instead,
the issue before the Court was whether a Judge Advocate Gen-
eral investigative report of a Navy aircraft crash was admissible
over the objection that it contained opinions. Second, the
Court faced a thoroughly inapposite situation to the problems
arising from NTSB evidence. As the Court noted, admission of
a government report is reasonable in the last instance because
"the admission of a report containing 'conclusions' is subject to
the ultimate safeguard-the opponent's right to present evi-
dence tending to contradict or diminish the weight of those
conclusions."20 The application of that principle was central to
the Court's decision: the JAG report in question not only con-
tained evidence of both the prevailing theory-pilot error-but
contained evidence of the countervailing theory, a power fail-
ure, which had been developed during the investigation. The
Supreme Court expressly held it error to have admitted in evi-
18 Id. (quoting W. KING AND D. PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 4
(1942)).
19 Id. at 169.
20 Id. at 168.
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dence the report with the prevailing theory opinion while ex-
cluding the evidence of the countervailing theory.2"
Both the decisions and the regulations implemented by the
NTSB present litigants with a very different problem than the
Court faced in Beech Aircraft v. Rainey. Consider that the Ninth
Circuit in Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors noted specifically
that the party participant system and application of 49 C.F.R.
§ 831 by the NTSB meant that: "At most, appellant may be de-
prived of certain evidence that could assist her in litigation.
22
The premise of Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, ante, is that the ultimate
test of unreliability of a government report is the right of a party
to present evidence tending to contradict or diminish the
weight of the reported findings. That is a false premise in NTSB
party participant-assisted investigations in which, like the
Teledyne engine tear down in question, the evidence becomes
unavailable for future study by the excluded parties due to in-
herently destructive testing. Moreover, in Beech Aircraft v. Rainey,
a competent "minority view" investigator did in fact participate
in the investigation and presented countervailing evidence for
consideration to the report's author for inclusion, contrary to
the practice in NTSB investigations, which excludes claimants
and their families, and occasionally even parties, from
investigations.23
The result is that NTSB evidence which does not account for
"evidence tending to contradict or diminish the weight of those
conclusions" is no longer presumptively trustworthy but, rather,
is presumptively untrustworthy. 24 One of the key tests of reliabil-
ity is whether an investigation into causation accounts for all
possible causes of the event or condition in question. 25 The
Fifth Circuit embraced this gate in aviation litigation in which
multiple potential explanations of a crash must be accounted
for as a predicate to reliability of opinion evidence. In Michaels
v. Avitech, Inc.,2 6 the Court upheld summary judgment finding
that a proposed expert opinion did not meet Daubert reliability
standards: "Given the variety of intervening events, the finding
21 The majority opinion wrote at length about the inclusion of the counter-
vailing evidence as "optional completeness" under FRE 106. Id. at 170.
22 Graham v. Teledyne-Cont'l Motors, 805 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987.).
23 Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 488 U.S. at 157-61.
24 Id. at 168.
25 See, e.g., In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 758-61 (3d
Cir. 1994).
26 Michaels v. Avitech, Inc., 202 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2000).
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of debris alone cannot support any rational inference that
Avitech's installation of the right pump was negligent, given that
the plaintiff's experts wholly fail to address and rule out the nu-
merous other potential causes."27
Two of the four trustworthiness pieces to the Rule 803(8) (c)
puzzle which the Beech Aircraft v. Rainey Court found to be essen-
tial do not exist in many NTSB investigations in which non-party
or minority-view investigators are systematically excluded. First,
there is the lack of anything resembling a hearing which, at the
least, a representative to the investigation for all sides would pro-
vide. Consequently, there is no check or balance to assure that
all possible causes of an accident are even recognized, much less
investigated to a point where a differential diagnosis can be ren-
dered by ruling in or ruling out causes other than those blessed
by party participants at the expense of non-parties. Second,
party participants who perform destructive testing do so both at
peril to a charge of spoliation and to a serious taint of bias, ei-
ther of which undermine the reliability of a conclusion since the
test or examination upon which it is founded cannot be repro-
duced, given that the part or component cannot be put back to
the test parameters after destructive examination.
As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court has substantially
altered the liberal purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) insofar as expert opinion testimony of causation is con-
cerned. Since Beech Aircraft v. Rainey was issued in 1988, the
prevailing standard for admission of such testimony has been
subjected to a gatekeeper evaluation. The proponent of expert
opinion testimony regarding the cause of an occurrence must
demonstrate before it is admitted that the methodology which
produced the opinion is reliable. 28 This produces two different
standards of admissibility for such evidence. FREs 702-705 con-
template the admission of expert opinion evidence as an excep-
tion to the general rule that a witness must speak from personal
knowledge, but such expert opinion evidence must first be
shown to be reliable as a pre-condition to being admitted. The
burden of establishing reliability of the evidence is on the party
offering the evidence. However, if that same evidence is offered
as an exception to the hearsay rule by a party who offers it as
written evidence in the form of a public document, pursuant to
FRE 803(8) (C), the information does not contain such a pre-
27 Id. at 753.
28 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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condition even though it contains opinions as well as factual
findings; the burden is instead on the party which opposes ad-
mission of such evidence to demonstrate that the evidence is not
trustworthy.29 Since evidence of an NTSB investigation may
come in either form, the distinction is problematic.
B. THE Two THREATS TO RELIABILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
OF EVIDENCE OF NTSB INVESTIGATIONS
Opinion evidence, expert or otherwise, and written public re-
ports of an investigation, are generally admissible for different
reasons. The former is permitted as an exception to FRE 602
which provides that a witness must have personal knowledge of
the subject about which he gives testimony. The latter is permit-
ted as an exception to Rule 802, which bars the admission of
hearsay evidence which cannot be subjected to cross examina-
tion. However, both opinion evidence and hearsay evidence
must be reliable.
Some waypoints of reliability and trustworthiness should be
noted because of two factors which pervade NTSB accident in-
vestigations and do affect the evidentiary value of such evidence.
These two factors are (1) the presence of systemic grit in the
NTSB mechanism and (2) the contributions which party partici-
pants may make to any particular investigation.
While there is no all-case bright line test for a trial court to
apply in assessing whether evidence is trustworthy or reliable,
there is an abundance of litmus. The published commentaries
which accompany each rule of evidence seek to guide courts
and counsel in application of the rule of evidence to particular
problems. The commentaries to Rule 803(8) (C) note four fac-
tors which were discussed by the Supreme Court in Beech Aircraft
v. Rainey, i.e.: (1) timeliness of the investigation; (2) the investi-
gator's skill; (3) whether a hearing was held; and (4) possible
bias in the investigation. To that must be added the gates of
reliability which have been articulated for admission of expert
testimony beginning with Daubert and in the subsequent deci-
sion of General Electric Co. v Joiner,"° Expert opinion evidence
must be reliable and may not have an analytical gap between the
observations or tests in question and the opinion proffered.'
29 For an excellent review of this issue, see Harvey Brown, Daubert Objections to
Public Records: Who Bears the Burden of Proof?, 39 Hous. L. REv. 413 ( 2002).
30 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
31 Id. at 146.
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The qualifications of the witnesses are inherent prerequisites to
the question of reliability.3 2 Other factors by which a court may
test such reliability include whether the method from which the
finding or conclusion was derived has been subjected to test-
ing,33 has been generally accepted in the relevant community
and peer reviewed,34 and whether the method produces consis-
tent results 5 There must not be so many unknown facts or un-
resolved variables as to render the finding unreliable.36 And, as
noted above, the investigation must reasonably account for all
possible causes of a crash, not only the cause subjectively consid-
ered by the party participants or NTSB investigator to be the
most probable.
Each of these factors plays a role in evaluating such evidence.
1. Inside the NTSB: Systemic Problems Which May Affect
Trustworthiness and Reliability of Evidence
Aviation has become much more complex and crowded than
was envisioned even twenty years ago. In order to help prepare
for the increasing demands such an environment has presented,
the National Transportation Safety Board commissioned the
RAND Institute (RAND) to conduct a self-critical study of NTSB
training and qualifications of its investigators and to assess the
adequacy of NTSB policies and practices to perform its tasks.
RAND used internal NTSB records of personnel, workload,
training, budgets, accidents, and reports to assess NTSB opera-
tions.37 RAND conducted extensive employee interviews and
collected extensive information about the practice of NTSB in-
vestigations through focused questionnaires completed by
NTSB staff. It met with and obtained reports from members of
the aviation community which might be properly considered as
interested parties, i.e., technical and legal representatives of air-
lines, manufacturers, and attorneys who specialize in aviation
litigation. 8
The RAND Institute issued a comprehensive report in 2000
which addressed many different facets of the work done and to
32 FED. R. EvID. 702.
33 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
34 Id. at 594.
35 Id. at 590 n. 9.
36 Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 479 (1st Cir. 1997);
Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Cent. Sur. & Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1969).
37 RAND, NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations, supra note 7.
38 Id. at xxviii.
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be done in the future by the NTSB. The goal of the report was
to assist the NTSB in assessing how it might change or modify its
methods to better perform its mission of preventing future acci-
dents through identifying both actual and potential causes of
events. The study clearly identified several serious problems
within the NTSB which have a direct bearing on whether evi-
dence of any particular investigation is reliable or trustworthy
within the limited confines of third party litigation. The Report
is an indispensable source of NTSB work load analysis.
From the study, it is clear that as the aviation industry pro-
duces more sophisticated equipment, which often depends on
computer-controlled solutions to rapidly changing flight condi-
tions, it is unlikely that NTSB investigators can keep up with the
thousands of versions of software, displays, and applications by
which modern aircraft are flown and controlled. Increasing de-
mands on air traffic control systems, the proliferation of airways
and of off-airway navigation with global positioning devices, and
ageing fleets compound the problems. However, the task of in-
vestigators is not to "keep up" with technological changes, but to
determine causes of accidents and incidents. Performance ex-
cursions and defects in equipment contribute to crashes and
leave no proof. This poses a terrible threat to NTSB investiga-
tors: how to determine cause of an electronic or systems failure
which destroys itself in the process of an accident or incident? It
poses an equal threat to courts and litigants who must depend
on their work. These problems are manifest in at least the fol-
lowing areas.
a. Work Overload
RAND concluded that a lack of resources is bringing the
NTSB close to the breaking point. Its budget is small. It has
fewer than 200 crash investigators. Nevertheless, the NTSB in-
vestigates more than 2,000 large and small aircraft accidents and
incidents each year. Included in this number is an average of
seven major domestic air crashes per year, 10 major foreign site
investigations per year, and almost 2000 general aviation acci-
dents per year.3 9 As a result, each NTSB investigator averages
more than 15 complete aviation crash assignments per year.
39 Id. at 152-55.
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RAND concluded that "the NTSB is facing a serious work
overload resulting from demand for its services and is in urgent
need of additional resources and management reform .... 40
b. Unfamiliarity and Complexity
Aviation crashes present an extraordinary number of failure
scenarios. One of the most perplexing examples of this diffi-
culty is the investigation of USAir Flight 427, in which a 737 sim-
ply fell off the radar screen in Visual Flight Rules weather, at
altitude and cruise speed, and with no warning. The wreckage
was extensively compromised both by impact and by post-crash
fire. The NTSB accident team dealt with a virtually endless
number of possible scenarios. The probable cause report con-
cluded that:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the
probable cause of the USAir flight 427 accident was a loss of con-
trol of the airplane resulting from the movement of the rudder
surface to its blowdown limit. The rudder surface most likely de-
flected in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots
as a result of a jam of the main rudder power control unit servo
valve secondary slide to the servo valve housing offset from its
neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide.41
This investigation is a poster child for the difficulty of systems
failures which have no historical failure precedents to assist
NTSB investigators. All such crashes tend to be one-of-a-kind
investigations. A major problem for investigators was that the
failure mode which was found to be the probable cause had not
previously been seen in that airframe. Many of the critical com-
ponents were so extensively damaged that investigators dis-
agreed as to their condition and pre-crash behaviors. The
probable cause finding was undoubtedly theoretical in most
senses of the word.
RAND noted:
The fact that complex events may fail to present clear reasons for
equipment or system failures poses a considerable challenge to
traditional Safety Board investigative practices. RAND found that
NTSB investigators are well prepared for accidents in which the
failure mode reveals itself through a careful examination of the
wreckage. An appreciation for the fact that catastrophic failures
can occur in complex systems without obvious physical evidence
40 Id. at xxix.
41 NTSB No. AAR-99/01.
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was less apparent. The "broken bolt" or "severed cable" repre-
sents the type of mechanical failure that can be located quickly
by analyzing debris. This type of "permanent state" failure is
readily identifiable. In complex systems, "reactive state" failures
can occur. Such modes of failure do not persist and therefore
evidence needed to trace the cause of the failure is not available
to investigators.42
When the most reliable investigative body in the world is chal-
lenged to reach conclusions because there is inadequate factual
evidence for investigators to depend upon in applying tradi-
tional and accepted methods to reconstruct a crash, courts must
likewise be challenged in admitting or excluding such evidence
by application of the known reliability waypoints. But, what is
left? Should findings and conclusions be admissible because the
best qualified body of investigators did the best it could? Or
should they be excluded because of a dearth of repeatable fail-
ure mode analysis, given a paucity of debris?
c. Training and Experience
Qualifications and skill are essential prerequisites under both
F.R.E. Rules 701-702 and under 803(8) (C). Courts have consist-
ently held that a lack of experience by the investigator will pre-
clude the admissions of a crash report. For example, in
Desrosiers v. Flight International of Florida, Inc.,4 the court of ap-
peals approved exclusion of parts of a Judge Advocate General
crash report:
The plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to support the dis-
trict court's conclusion that Lt. Cmdr. Hamilton was not quali-
fied to render expert opinions. The record shows: 1) Lt.
Hamilton did not attend aviation accident reconstruction school
until after completing the JAG report; 2) he had no formal train-
ing in aircraft accident investigation; 3) this was the firstJAG air-
craft accident report Lt. Hamilton ever prepared; and 4) Lt.
Hamilton never reviewed the avionics maintenance records
before issuing the report.44
Those specific criticisms are unlikely to apply to NTSB investi-
gators. Most of these employees are mid-career technical em-
ployees hired from careers in aviation. Most have technical
special skills in at least one area, such as piloting and engineer-
42 RAND, NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations, supra note 7, at 60.
43 Desrosiers v. Flight Int'l of Fla., Inc., 156 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998).
44 Id.
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ing. New employees are taught basic aviation accident investiga-
tion courses. However, after employees are absorbed into the
crushing workload in which they rarely see the same airframe
more than one or two times in a year, if ever, training opportu-
nities are limited by budget, workload, and the diversity of top-
ics. Few NTSB employees ever have the opportunity to become
as familiar with a single airframe as an airline employee. Given
that aircraft systems become more complex as manufacturers
identify complex design solutions to flight problems, the NTSB
investigator becomes a "generalist," albeit a very competent one,
in a world of microspecialists (who are usually employed by the
parties being investigated). This poses problems for blind faith
dependence on an investigation which by necessity requires that
very skilled people with no knowledge of the unique airframe,
component, or failure modes in turn depend on specialists who
are employees of parties with much at stake. The opinion of the
generalist is at risk.4
5
In this regard, the RAND study found that:
The success of the NTSB depends on the continuing technical
excellence of its staff, but at present it does not have a well-struc-
tured training program or a commensurate set of facilities that
support both training and engineering analysis....
[T] he NTSB's limited training program is not a reliable outlet
for informing the professional staff about state-of-the-art technol-
ogies or the future aviation environment.
Because of the stochastic nature of accident events, investiga-
tors are often introduced to the intricacies of new equipment
only when an accident occurs. There is no guarantee that investi-
gating an accident involving an older aircraft, such as a Boeing
747-100, will prepare an investigator for subsequent investigation
involving a more modern airliner, such as an Airbus 340 or a
45 See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991). In
Christophersen, the district court scrutinized a doctor's lack of specialized
experience:
Dr. Miller is not an expert in either oncology or pathology. Miller's
opinion as to the cause of Christophersen's death was formed with-
out consultation with oncologists or other cancer specialists. Dr.
Miller's experience with cancer occurred during his residency
when he assisted in a study of the immune system as affected by
smoking and asbestos. Dr. Miller does not routinely treat cancer
patients, nor has he ever treated a patient with a colon cancer of
the type that affected Christophersen.
Id. at 1112.
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Boeing 777. The amount of available time for maintaining profi-
ciency and acquiring new skills is very limited.... 46
d. Accuracy of Records and Reports
The complexity of maintaining and retrieving huge databases
of historical data has contributed to the difficulty NTSB employ-
ees, and others, experience in obtaining records for use in inves-
tigations. The RAND study concluded: "However, there is
neither oversight nor an emphasis on accuracy in the collection
and maintenance of NTSB records. As a result, the accuracy of
most of the NTSB data sources was related as "poor" in the
RAND analysis ... .
e. Dependence on Others
Finally, the combination of the above factors has the potential
to lead investigators into error. Complex failure modes, depen-
dence on party representatives, a lack of familiarity with equip-
ment or systems, and a lack of time and funding to both hire
and train sufficient employees to perform the NTSB mission has
implications in the work they produce being used outside their
mission, i.e., in third party litigation:
The current state of training at the NTSB. . .implies a steady
degradation of staff skills, a matter of concern for an agency with
a national safety role. The current situation is of particular con-
cern because .... the NTSB is facing more complex accident
investigations that increasingly involve design-related issues asso-
ciated with high-level systems integration....
The impact of insufficient training is much more subtle, such
as the technical question that goes unasked or the possible acci-
dent cause that goes unexplored because the investigator does
not possess adequate technical knowledge of a particular system.
Investigators have related instances of misrepresentation by
parties that were uncovered only because of the technical knowl-
edge of the NTSB staff, underscoring the need to maintain a
skilled staff through a combination of hiring and training.
One party representative from the aviation community pri-
vately stated to RAND researchers that information would be
given to the NTSB investigators only if "they [the investigators]
knew to ask the right questions [s] .""8
46 RAND, NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations, supra note 7, at xxxviii - xxxix.
47 Id. at xli.
48 Id. at 166.
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If anything can be stated without dispute, it is that the NTSB
and its employees are indeed professional, competent, diligent,
and afflicted with less bias than anyone might reasonably expect.
From a policy standpoint, one must say "Thank goodness for the
NTSB." Without it, the skies would be far less safe than the high
level of sanctity we enjoy. From an evidentiary standpoint, how-
ever, one must be diligent that NTSB evidence is reliable and is
NTSB evidence rather than the product of a party with much at
stake in the case. The systemic compromises forced on the
NTSB and its employees by budget and labor constraints put the
quality of the evidence at risk when analyzed by Daubert or Rule
803 standards. That superior knowledge of extremely narrow
technical information is in the exclusive possession of parties
being investigated, combined with gamesmanship, means that
the party participant system has great potential to produce evi-
dence which is neither the product of the NTSB nor produced
by a reliable and independent investigation based on an ade-
quate foundation of facts concerning increasingly-complex
equipment and failure modes likewise puts the quality of the
evidence at risk when analyzed by Daubert or Rule 803 standards.
In sum, the questions about such evidence are: Is this the work
product of the NTSB or of a party, and why can it be trusted?
2. Party Participant Threats to the Trustworthiness and Reliability
of Evidence from an NTSB Investigation
As a prologue to this issue, it is necessary to note that there
are at least three limits to NTSB evidence which must be consid-
ered. First, the NTSB has by regulation attempted to restrict
oral testimony by its employees. Second, the NTSB has by regu-
lation attempted to define those documents resulting from
NTSB investigations to which it has no objection as evidence in
third party proceedings, and to identify those which are meant
to be prohibited as evidence.
Third, 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) and its predecessors expressly pro-
hibit admission of the NTSB probable cause report into evi-
dence in third party litigation. Even so, the use of NTSB reports
or portions of such reports has had a litigious history.49 A num-
ber of federal courts admitted NTSB final reports or some por-
49 In re Air Crash at Charlotte, 982 F. Supp. 1071 (D. S.C. 1996), contains a very
good summary of the cases, both for and against, admission of all or any portions
of an NTSB Board report.
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tion of them as evidence in third party liability proceedings.5"
Others criticized the practice and set about to exclude all por-
tions of the NTSB final report.
5 1
The NTSB weighed in to protect its neutral status by opposing
the admission of final Board reports while still defending the
party participant system in ways that are not neutral. For exam-
ple, in Chiron Corp. & PerSeptive Biosystems v. NVTSB, 52 a dispute
arose between two party participants over the disclosure of a
cargo list which would identify the items being shipped on
board a crashed Federal Express airplane. Federal Express pro-
vided the list to the NTSB but asserted it was a trade secret, and
the NTSB refused to disclose it to the other party participants.
53
They contended they had the right as party participants to see
the list to explore whether any of the cargo may have caused the
crash, a fact which it asserted the NTSB should investigate as
part of its duty to determine cause and which if not explored
would hurt them in subsequent third party litigation. The
NTSB asserted that it had the right to conduct the investigation
as it saw fit and that its ultimate report could not hurt the parties
anyway since no part of it would be admissible in evidence in
later third party litigation.54 The Court agreed, ruling on a case
not pending before it or even yet filed, that not even the factual
portions of the NTSB final report would be admissible in some
future case.
The NTSB has also attempted by regulation to distinguish be-
tween those reports which are inadmissible pursuant to the stat-
ute and other reports to which the NTSB has no objection as
evidence in third party litigation. 49 C.F.R. § 835.2 provides the
Board's definitions which attempt to distinguish the two:
Board Accident report means the report containing the Board's
determinations, including the probable cause of an accident, is-
sued either as a narrative report or in a computer format
("briefs" of accidents). Pursuant to section 701 (e) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 (FA Act), and section 304(c) of the Inde-
pendent Safety Board Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. 1154(b)) (Safety
5o See, e.g., In reAir Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1493
(D. Colo. 1989). At a later proceeding, the court decided to admit a Human
Factors Report which formed a basis for the Board's probable cause report. 720
F. Supp. 1515 (D. Colo. 1989).
51 In reAir Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
52 Chiron Corp. & PerSpective Biosystems v. NTSB, 198 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
53 Id. at 937.
54 Id. at 940-41.
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Act), no part of a Board accident report may be admitted as evi-
dence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of
any matter mentioned in such reports. 55
Factual accident report means the report containing the results
of the investigator's investigation of the accident. The Board
does not object to, and there is no statutory bar to, admission in
litigation of factual accident reports. In the case of a major inves-
tigation, group chairman factual reports are factual accident
reports.
Thus the NTSB has by regulation attempted to articulate a
distinction between reports of the Board itself and reports writ-
ten by NTSB employees in the course of their investigations. As
a further measure, the NTSB has also promulgated the follow-
ing regulation:
(a) Section 701 (e) of the FA Act and section 304(c) of the Safety
Act preclude the use or admission into evidence of Board
accident reports in any suit or action for damages arising
from accidents. These sections reflect Congress' "strong * *
* desire to keep the Board free of the entanglement of such
suits." Rep. No. 93-1192, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 44 (1974), and
serve to ensure that the Board does not exert an undue influ-
ence on litigation. The purposes of these sections would be
defeated if expert opinion testimony of Board employees,
which may be reflected in the views of the Board expressed
in its reports, were admitted in evidence or used in litigation
arising out of an accident. The Board relies heavily upon its
investigators' opinions in its deliberations. Furthermore, the
use of Board employees as experts to give opinion testimony
would impose a significant administrative burden on the
Board's investigative staff. Litigants must obtain their expert
witnesses from other sources.
(b) For the reasons stated in paragraph (a) of this section and
§ 835.1, Board employees may only testify as to the factual
information they obtained during the course of an investiga-
tion, including factual evaluations embodied in their factual
accident reports. However, they shall decline to testify re-
garding matters beyond the scope of their investigation, and
they shall not give any expert or opinion testimony.
(c) Board employees may testify about the firsthand information
they obtained during an investigation that is not reasonably
available elsewhere, including observations recorded in their
own factual incident reports. Consistent with the principles
cited in § 835.1 and this section, current Board employees
55 49 C.F.R. § 835.2 (2002).
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are not authorized to testify regarding other employee's re-
ports, or other types of Board documents, including but not
limited to safety recommendations, safety studies, safety pro-
posals, safety accomplishments, reports labeled studies, and
analysis reports, as they contain staff analysis and/or Board
conclusions.56
The limitations which the NTSB has attempted to put in place
can be summarized as follows: First, NTSB Board Reports, in
which the probable cause of a crash are stated, are neither ad-
missible in evidence nor may be the subject of oral testimony by
an NTSB employee. Second, NTSB investigators may testify, but
may not give expert or opinion testimony. Third, NTSB investiga-
tors may not testify about any other employee's reports.
Not all courts or litigants are quite so complacent about relin-
quishing the source of such reputable evidence. In Kline v Mar-
tin," staff counsel instructed an investigator to not answer a
number of deposition questions, including opinions about
whether evidence revealed malfunction before the crash, pilot
incapacitation, and what happened. 58 The trial court noted that
former 14 C.F.R. § 435 (now apparently 49 C.F.R. § 835) limited
the testimony of investigators to facts actually observed by them.
However, the court ruled that only conclusory opinions as to the
ultimate issue of probable cause of the accident were barred
under the policy behind Section 1441 (e), and ordered the inves-
tigators to answer certain questions, including whether the in-
vestigator found any evidence that the aircraft was not intact at
time of impact and whether he had determined the angle that
the aircraft struck the mountain.59 Most people would agree
that those subjects call for opinions, although whether lay or
expert is by no means clear.
Another attempt to test the trustworthiness of NTSB em-
ployee factual findings was made in McCandless v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.,60 Beech served a subpoena on the NTSB for an employee
deposition. It sought to obtain deposition testimony about the
crash and also sought written file materials from which it,
Beech, hoped to determine whether Alexander's report lacked
trustworthiness. The Court concluded that until the trial court
ruled in advance of trial whether it was going to admit Alexan-
56 Id. § 835.3(a)-(c).
57 Kline v. Martin, 245 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972).
58 Id. at 32.
59 Id. at 32-33.
60 McCandless v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 697 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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der's safety analyses into evidence, a decision on whether Alex-
ander might be deposed about its underlying trustworthiness
was sufficiently premature to justify staying the deposition. The
implications of this decision are striking. If McCandless means
what it says, litigants may easily find themselves caught between
courts of different circuits or jurisdictions which find reasons to
not permit development of NTSB evidence or preclude inquir-
ies into NTSB methodology. Ordinarily, a trial court will not de-
termine admissibility until after trustworthiness is established,
rather than the reverse. Moreover, the court of appeals was sit-
ting in the Washington D.C. circuit, whereas the trial was pend-
ing before a district court in Texas.
A similar dilemma is presented by In re Air Crash at Dallas Fort
Worth Airport on August 2, 1985,61 in which a party sought to ob-
tain "notes, diagrams, photographs, memoranda, or other docu-
ments or writings related to or arising out of the investigation of
the crash" by subpoena to the NTSB in order to evaluate the
findings and conclusions of the factual reports.62 The NTSB
did not ground its objections on the limits which it has written
into 49 C.F.R. § 835 which restrict the use of documents in an
employee deposition. The Board instead asserted that the mate-
rial sought to be discovered was privileged in that it was not a
final product or approved or adopted by the Board. The Board
objected that this material is privileged, work composed in the
course of developing official action, but not made a part of the
official action. The court concluded that such records are not
discoverable from NTSB employees.
The implications of these decisions, as well as the limits in 49
C.F.R. § 835, pose a serious problem: if a litigant cannot see the
work product of an investigator, by what means can a litigant
discover trustworthiness? The most neutral method to discover
such trustworthiness is to ask the witness. Someone bears the
burden of determining trustworthiness, either to demonstrate it
in order that testimony may be admitted or to impeach it, in
order that a written public report may not be admitted, as the
case may be. This puts courts and litigants in prison dure etforte
i.e., between a rock and a hard place. By application of the
NTSB regulations a party cannot obtain the underlying file ma-
terial which should reveal to what extent the NTSB report or
6 In re Air Crash at Dallas Fort Worth Airport on August 2,1985, 117 F.R.D.
392 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
62 Id. at 393.
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testimony are reliable. If the NTSB or a party obtains a protec-
tive order or judicial injunction against deposing an NTSB em-
ployee about the subject matter and about his methodology and
conclusions until after the trial court rules on admissibility, a
party cannot reasonably prepare to either present or oppose evi-
dence of the NTSB investigation, even if such evidence is limited
to group reports or investigator factual reports. Given that the
Supreme Court is neither able nor willing to distinguish be-
tween factual and opinion testimony and between lay opinion
testimony and expert opinion testimony,6 3 the blanket which 49
C.F.R. § 835 draws over NTSB employee testimony is often
neither workable nor useful. At some point the Cheshire cat
must appear or the grin will fade away.
The only statutory bar to NTSB evidence is 49 U.S.C.
§ 1154(b), which bars admission of the NTSB probable cause
report. The purpose of the statute was to: (a) insure that the
opinions of the NTSB were developed for its mission of accident
prevention through neutral and independent investigation; and
(b) to prevent such investigations from displacing the courts
and juries in third party litigation.64 However, from the outset,
both litigants and courts have wrestled with alternatives to sim-
ply offering the probable cause report as evidence. Before long,
the alternative sources of such evidence were tendered in the
form of NTSB investigator testimony and NTSB investigator fac-
tual reports.
In American Airlines, a party objected to admission of NTSB
investigator deposition testimony which included a graph and a
flight data recorder interpretive document, asserting that such
evidence was an opinion and hence inadmissible pursuant to
the statute.6 5 The court held otherwise, stating that:
American Airlines' position on the reach of § 1441(e) seems
thoroughly at variance with the prevailing interpretation of the
statute. As stated in Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 3 Cir., 1963,
317 F.2d 628, 632, "the primary thrust of the provision is to ex-
clude C.A.B. reports which express agency views as to the proba-
33 "Our conclusion that neither language of the Rule nor the intent of its fram-
ers calls for a distinction between "fact" and "opinion" is strengthened by the
analytical difficulty of drawing such a line. It has frequently been remarked that
the distinction between statements of fact and opinion is, at best, one of de-
gree. . . ." Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167 (1988).
64 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969);
Israel v. United States, 247 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1957).
65 Id. at 195-96.
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ble cause of the accident." Exhibits 58 and 89 are not the report
of the C.A.B. and do not reflect the Board's evaluation of the
data they contain or the emphasis placed on that data in reach-
ing a decision on probable cause. To the contrary the exhibits
merely display and explain the data derived from the flight re-
corder foil itself, which was admitted without objection.6 6
The decision seems consistent with the purpose of the statute:
Allow the NTSB to do its work and not allow it or its employees
to become expert arbiters of third party liability. As usual, the
devil is in the details.
Enter the party participants.
American Airlines referred to and relied upon the earlier deci-
sion of Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.67 The Berguido trial court
likewise had allowed testimony of two CAB (forerunner of the
NTSB) investigators who related certain calculations involved in
their investigations. The two employees were the chairmen of
the Operations Committee and the Structures Committee of the
CAB investigation into the crash. They did not provide an opin-
ion or evaluation on the probable cause of the crash. They testi-
fied by deposition from observations at the scene about
propeller slash marks on trees and impact marks on turf and
trees. These observations led them to make findings and con-
clusions that the aircraft speed at impact was 140 kph; the angle
of descent was 2 1/2 degrees at 10 fps; thatjust before impact the
angle of descent was 11 1/2 degrees in a right bank, and; that the
aircraft was 4 3/4 degrees nose up.6 8 Cross examination devel-
oped that, although he personally observed the physical condi-
tions at the scene, CAB employee Van Epps got the figures from
CAB employee Searle. On further cross examination, it was de-
veloped that Searle got the figures from a Lockheed aeronauti-
cal engineer working "under Searle's supervision."69
The Plaintiff contended that the Lockheed engineer only pro-
vided mathematics whereas the defendant contended that the
Lockheed engineer's work was hearsay. The Berguido court
found on appeal that the calculations were not "evaluation or
opinion testimony" because the mathematics showed that the
party representative had to make certain assumptions and
choices relative to the physical facts before he could "reach the
66 Id.
67 Berguido v. E. Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
68 Id. at 630-31.
69 Id. at 631.
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final computation stage" and that CAB employee Searle had no
knowledge how the engineer arrived at the figures or what as-
sumptions he made. 0 The court concluded that this informa-
tion was hearsay and could not be admitted through evidence
derived from the CAB.
The court in Berguido reached its conclusion on the premise
that the defendant had been unable to cross examine the Lock-
heed engineer and thus the CAB evidence was essentially inad-
missible hearsay. However, the vice in the mathematics lay in
that its reliability could not be demonstrated:
Furthermore, the testimony of Searle indicates that he had no
knowledge of how Schmidt arrived at his final figures and what
assumptions were made in the process. The inherent vice of all
hearsay evidence so becomes apparent, for, at the very least, de-
fendant had no opportunity to cross-examine Schmidt and ascer-
tain from him the basis of his computations; to test the validity of
said basis, including whatever assumptions he made, if any, and
what he did regarding the information available to him; to ascer-
tain his method of computation and to test its validity, etc. For
this reason we hold that it was prejudicial error to admit the evi-
dence at the trial.7v
This language is a clear forerunner of both Beech Aircraft v.
Rainey and Daubert. In the former case, the Supreme Court ob-
served that the ultimate test of trustworthiness is the ability of a
party to present evidence tending to diminish or contradict the
weight of conclusions in a government report.7 2 One cannot
easily diminish or contradict evidence for which the underlying
basis can neither be explained nor demonstrated. In the latter
case, it was concluded that such evidence should not have to be
diminished or contradicted; if the underlying basis for it cannot
be shown to be reliable, it should not be admitted in evidence in
the first place.73
The party participant system has thus placed evidence from
the NTSB of its investigation into a difficult position. While pre-
sumptively admissible pursuant to FRE 803(8) (C), if offered in
the form of an investigator's report, it is not admissible if in fact
it is not trustworthy. To determine whether it is trustworthy, it is
necessary to determine whether such evidence has its origins in
observations, tests, data, measurements, or technical informa-
70 Id. at 632.
71 Id.
72 Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988).
73 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
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tion observed completely independently by the NTSB employee
who composed the report, as in American Airlines, Inc. v. United
States,"4 or whether the evidence came from similar observations,
tests, data, measurements, or technical information contributed
by a party participant, as in Berguido.75 Finally, the only way to
determine the source of the data appears to be to take the depo-
sition of an NTSB employee, who is prohibited by his or her
employer's regulations from testifying about anything more
than "the factual information they obtained during the course
of an investigation, including factual evaluations embodied in
their factual accident reports.
76
As both the RAND Institute study and Berguido suggest, the
involvement of party participants in NTSB investigations is a fre-
quent threat to the reliability or trustworthiness of NTSB evi-
dence. It is no longer reasonable, if it ever was, to suggest that
party participants labor with a blind eye to the consequences of
an NTSB investigation. Not only is the probable cause determi-
nation a road map for liability, even if not admissible in evi-
dence, but the threat of an expensive safety recommendation
from the NTSB or FAA, such as an airworthiness directive, is a
significant financial risk for manufacturers. The RAND Institute
study explained:
Clearly, an airline or manufacturer knows more about the en-
gineering, design, or operation of its own aircraft than any NTSB
investigator, no matter how experienced. The motivation for
parties to withhold information that might be relevant to the
cause of the accident, or to deflect attention for an area of possi-
ble culpability, is obvious. The question is whether, in fact, this
occurs....
RAND researchers collected much anecdotal evidence sug-
gesting that full disclosure of relevant information by parties dur-
ing major investigations cannot always be assured....
NTSB investigators reported instances of misrepresentation
and outright lying by the company's party participants, uncov-
ered only because of the NTSB staff's extensive knowledge....
In addition, much of the evidence and expertise resides with
parties who may be reluctant to be forthcoming. Senior NTSB
investigators concur that parties may eventually convey critical in-
74 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
75 Berguido, 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
76 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b).
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formation if asked the right questions, but that sometimes infor-
mation is not volunteered ....
A more untrustworthy report can hardly be imagined than the
investigation behind Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp78 There, men
died in a small Piper aircraft in rural Alaska. The estates of the
two men filed third party liability suits for wrongful death dam-
ages. One of the estates was dismissed by summary judgment on
the statute of limitations, over protest that the plaintiffs could
not have known during the period of the NTSB investigation
that the carburetor had a manufacturing defect. The other pas-
senger estate appears to have sued the carburetor manufacturer
timely. The case went to trial about sixteen months later. In
that trial, the judge made specific findings of fact that the carbu-
retor had a manufacturing defect. The judge also made specific
findings that the manufacturer knew that some of its carburet-
ors contained manufacturing defects but that it had nevertheless
told the FAA, the engine manufacturer, and the public that au-
tomobile gasoline was the cause of the problem.79 It urged the
FAA to issue an Airworthiness Directive requiring replacement
of the defective part as a consequence of gasoline damage so
that consumers would pay for the repair, rather than disclose
that there were known manufacturing defects, in which instance
an airworthiness directive would have obliged the manufacturer
to pay for the replacement. The first family, long dismissed by
summary judgment, moved for relief from the judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 based on the findings in the
companion case and the evidence that the manufacturer had
concealed the known manufacturing defects from the NTSB
and deceptively cultivated the "auto gas theory."8 The party
participant's deception led to an NTSB report which did not
reflect the role which the defect played in the crash.8
In Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 82 an engine
manufacturer did not supply the NTSB with failed test results of
an engine it had assembled with a modified procedure, which
later led to a fatal crash. The NTSB was able to evaluate the
condition only because of a combination of fortuitous facts.
77 RAND, NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations, supra note 7, at 104-05.
78 Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp., 838 P.2d 1243 (Alaska 1992).
79 Id. at 1246.
80 Id. at 1250.
81 Id.
82 Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir.
1992).
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Even though Turbomeca denied that the condition in question
caused the crash, it had previously issued an Urgent Service Bul-
letin recommending a procedure to avoid the problem. 3 The
failure occurred twenty-one times previously.
Given that party participants are often the only sources of
technical manufacturing and failure analysis information,
courts, counsel, and juries must be skeptical of a system which
has no process for separating the good from the bad. The diffi-
culty is that the NTSB investigators (who are institutionally
comfortable with the process anyway), have no choice but to de-
pend on party participants. The thin line between trustworthi-
ness and fraud depends on the skill of NTSB investigators (or,
later, diligent discovery), to detect when someone has crossed
the line.
Party participant threats to trustworthiness and reliability are
not limited to the Turbomeca, Berguido, and Borg-Warner situa-
tions. A more common problem is that the reliability of a con-
tribution made by a party participant simply cannot be
established. For example, in In re Air Crash at Charlotte, North
Carolina July 2, 1994,84 the court excluded the Weather Group
report which would have been otherwise admissible under 49
C.F.R. § 835.2.85 The Weather Group report contained con-
densed summaries of witness statements. The witnesses had
originally been interviewed by a party participant, who wrote
notes, then condensed them, then discarded his notes. He pro-
vided them to the Weather Group chairman who included them
in the group report. Some of the persons interviewed said the
Weather Group report incompletely or inaccurately character-
ized their statements.
In Christ v. IBM, 6 the factual report of the NTSB investigator
was deemed untrustworthy to the extent that it relied on manu-
facturer-conducted tests which he did not attend. "In contrast,
no one ever informed us that Mr. Twine had attended the other
manufacturer's tests. He had no knowledge of any part of the
test or how the reports were prepared."87
83 Id. at 1436.
84 In re Air Crash at Charlotte, North Carolina July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. 1071
(D.S.C. 1996).
85 Id. at 1078-79.
86 Christ v. IBM, 20 Phila. 610 (1989 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 91).
87 Id.
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In John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,88 the Third Circuit
upheld the exclusion of NTSB investigative accident reports.
The reports included, and the findings were essentially based
on, statements by pilots, accident witnesses, and reports of inves-
tigators from other government agencies. To some extent this
appears to be the very situation that Beech Aircraft v. Rainey had
in mind when Justice Brennan stated that factual reports in-
cluded those which result from the preparer dealing with dis-
puted evidence.89 The distinction appears to lie in two factors.
First, a report which merely mimics information fed to the au-
thor is not an independent investigation, but is simply the prod-
uct of those who contributed information of unknown quality.
Second, in Beech Aircraft v. Rainey, the report in question con-
tained the evidence for both the prevailing and the counter-
vailing probable cause conclusions. That simply won't occur in
most NTSB factual investigations in which the key technical data
is provided to the NTSB by parties with much at stake in third
party litigation.
A related question was presented in Fraley v. Rockwell Interna-
tional Corp.90 Two reports were presented, one prepared by a
JAG investigator, one prepared by an experienced employee of
the NARF naval rework facility.9' Both the JAG investigation
and the NARF report relied exclusively on hearsay given by both
military and non-military sources. Accordingly, both were based
on information which was not subject to cross examination.
However, the NARF report was prepared by an experienced in-
vestigator whereas the JAG report was not. The trial court split
the baby. Without citing authority, the court stated that:
[I] deally, the author will have first-hand knowledge of the factual
statements which he has made. However, if he does not, the first-
hand knowledge requirement imposed by FRE 602 still can be
satisfied if the author had first hand knowledge of the statements
made by declarants who did have first-hand knowledge of the
facts mentioned in the factual findings of the public document.92
Both reports amounted to hearsay based upon hearsay, but the
JAG report was inadmissible for lack of trustworthiness. The
court considered that as the document was prepared by an inex-
88 John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 635-36 (3d Cir.
1997).
89 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 162 (1988).
90 Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
91 Id. at 1265.
92 Id. at 1266-67.
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perienced investigator in a highly complex field of investigation,
the document lacked the reliability necessary to be admitted
into evidence.
Fraley suggests that if a NTSB investigator is experienced, his
hearsay on hearsay report is admissible. This is contrary to the
Berguido analysis, in which it was concluded that the underlying
material on which the investigator relied must be indepen-
dently reliable and admissible. No other court appears to have
validated hearsay on hearsay based on the experience of the
author.9 4
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Because of the statutory inadmissibility of NTSB probable
cause final reports, parties do not have the use of public, profes-
sional, and unprivileged evidence, theoretically because it would
improperly sway the jury and because it would impair the neu-
trality and independence of the NTSB. The remaining evidence
available from NTSB investigations, such as group reports, inves-
tigator factual reports, and investigator depositions is subject to
careful scrutiny. Systemic problems, party participants, and ex-
cluding parties from investigations threaten the reliability and
trustworthiness of the product. The end result is probably not
satisfactory to anyone.
As an epilogue, consider McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd.9 5
This rather innocuous summary judgment case illustrates both
the weight played by NTSB evidence and the impracticality of
embroiling the NTSB in third party litigation. In McLean, a
Piper Cherokee airplane operated by a low time pilot crashed. 6
The aircraft had been maintained by two mechanics who were
not licensed aircraft mechanics. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment, finding that the NTSB report was definitive and
that the opinions submitted by the plaintiffs' experts were too
far-fetched to be reliable. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged
the basic skill of the NTSB investigator, pointing out that the
93 Id. at 1267.
94 See, e.g., Meder v Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1981)
(excluding a police report on causation which was not trustworthy when the of-
ficer could not recall the source of the statements);John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1977) (excluding the hearsay on hearsay re-
port as simply double hearsay).
95 McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2000).
96 Id. at 799.
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NTSB investigator's "primary expertise is in helicopters. '" 97
Moreover, the appellants asserted that the trial court erred in
treating the NTSB investigator's report as definitive since it had
been contradicted by plaintiffs' expert testimony. This was
clearly the situation anticipated by the Supreme Court in Beech
Aircraft v. Rainey.
McLain's lessons are fundamental. By virtue of 49 C.F.R.
§ 835, NTSB investigators are neither experts within the limited
confines of Rules 702-703 nor necessarily in a position to ex-
plain their observations and investigations through the use of
lay opinions pursuant to Rule 701. NTSB workloads and train-
ing preclude such investigators from being finely tuned to the
minutiae of thousands of versions of hundreds of airframes. It is
unfair to them to hold them to such standards, given their mis-
sion. At the same time, it is equally unwise to disregard the issue
of reliability or trustworthiness in procuring and offering their
evidence. On the other hand, if evidence of NTSB investiga-
tions is not developed and presented, proof of the causes of
aviation accidents and incidents may be limited to strained and
far-fetched opinions by investigators picking through the re-
mains or to the opinions of employees of the wealthiest liti-
gants, who happen to be privileged insiders to the investigation.
The influence of party participants who are at cross purposes
with claimants and with each other, destruction of vital evidence
both in the event and in post-crash technical examinations, and
the exponentially-growing complexity of aviation equipment il-
lustrate the urgent need for neutral documentation and authen-
tication, both for the safety of the flying public and for private
litigants. At the same time, such neutral and reliable documen-
tation and authentication should be admissible in evidence, as it
is in any other catastrophe investigated by a public agency other
than the NTSB.
No one disputes that the NTSB must be allowed to perform its
functions in a neutral and impartial manner. However, it does
not necessarily follow that it must do so in a vacuum. If its inves-
tigation of a crash is reliable and trustworthy, the evidence
should be admitted. If the report or testimony describing the
investigation is the unfortunate product of factors which make it
unreliable, it should not be used to sway the judge and jury.
As lawyers and judges have always known, stating the rule is
simple. It is in applying the rule that the devil is in the details.
97 Id. at 803.
